The post hopes to give brief insight into some of the key narratives that have been employed in strategic and governmental discourse relating to biometrics in the War on Terror. Whilst by no means comprehensive, it is hoped that this it gives at least some idea of how biometrics were framed, and how their use is understood and legitimized. It is the first post in a series which will look at this topic, following entries will engage with Agamben, Butler and Foucault in order to explore biometrics as a biopolitical technology.
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“Just as the US military has established its superiority in other arts of war, now, working with other US Government organisations, it must strive for identity dominance over terrorist […] threats who pose harm to American lives and interests”
John D. Woodward, RAND[1]
“If Congress was funding biometrics, things like the attempted Christmas Day bombing wouldn’t have ever happened […] If we were properly analyzing the biometrics data and feeding it to the right agencies — like DHS and DoS — that guy would have never even been given a visa from the State Department to enter the United States in the first place,”
Lani Hay, Lanmark Technology Inc.[2]
For every journalistic or academic article that claims the events of September 11th 2001 heralded the dawn of a new age in global politics and international relations, there is another that directly refutes this claim. Whilst there may be disagreement as to the relative shift or continuity in the dominant narrative of politics and security following the attack on the World Trade Centre, there is a general (albeit not universal) consensus that surveillance and monitoring technologies have proliferated and their development accelerated.
During the immediate aftermath of September 11th, as politicians, strategists and thinkers scrambled to explain both what had happened and how it could have been allowed to happen. The concepts of prediction, prevention and pre-emptive action were central to the majority of responses within the security establishment. The foundational logic being that the world that would be a great deal safer if only ambiguity, ambivalence and uncertainty could be controlled.[3]
The US House of Representatives concluded, in 2002, that:
“Had information coordination technology been properly in place before September 11, the pre-attack activities of the hijackers could have been identified and prevented. There may have been a different outcome”[4]
In this view, the incident could potentially have been prevented if only there were systems in place to capture and analyse evidence of latent threats – which was imagined as being readily available. Those consulted – including advisors from the private security sector and commercial management consultants – summarised that with adequate surveillance and profiling technology, the events of 9/11 could have been “predicted and averted”[5] Accordingly, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the Department of Defence (DoD) and the Federal and State legislations embarked on the task of developing and implementing a wide range of advanced surveillance measures, with biometrics playing a central role.
As part of a narrative that has sought to both legitimise exceptional responses and emphasise their normality, biometric technologies have become a highly integrated component of the US security strategy both at home and overseas. The financial investment made in biometric technology by the US Government is far from insignificant. The US VISIT border management project, for example, was initially scheduled for $10billion and further funds have been appropriated from congress in subsequent years.[6] Similarly, the DoD budget allocation for biometric projects in overseas operations and conflict zones has stretched into billions of UD dollars, with an estimated expenditure of around $3.5billion to date.[7]
The UK government responded in a similar fashion, both in the wake of September 11th and, particularly, following the London bombings of July 7th 2005. Biometric technology was a key component of an evolving security discourse of risk prevention through increased knowledge. Former Prime Minister Tony Blair stated, in 2006, that:
“I am convinced, as are our security services, that a secure [biometric] identity system will help us counter terrorism and international crime. Terrorists routinely use multiple identities – up to 50 at a time – to hide and confuse. ”[8]
And in a separate address:
“[It is] more important than ever that we know with confidence who is entering our country. That is why biometric technology is integral to securing our borders so identities can be checked and fixed before people leave for Britain.”[9]
Biometrics in strategic/political discourse
With such a high uptake of biometric surveillance, it is little surprise that these technologies have received significant attention from strategists, and from those broadly concerned with the realm of security studies. However, echoing some critiques that have been levelled at security studies engagement with technology more broadly[10], it is argued here that there has been relatively little work which critically reflects on the evolving relationships between biometric technology, society and security.
Peoples argues, in his work Justifying Ballistic Missile Defence, that whilst traditional security studies “ostensibly prioritises the relationship between technology and security” it is simultaneously guilty of “maintaining a particularly emaciated conception [of this relationship]”.[11] In the case of biometric technology, traditional security studies and policy debates have been characterised by a rather limited engagement with both the wider social impact of biometrics, their (mutually constitutive) relationship with security, and with the political and normative values which underpin the increased adoption of these technologies.
Biometrics are framed in a number of different ways by policy leaders and security professionals. In general, these narratives can be seen as seeking to both securitise and normalise the use of biometric technology – simultaneously framing biometrics as an exceptional response and characterising them as technical manifestations of modernity and convenience. The following paragraphs will briefly introduce some of these narratives, prior to the next chapter, which will discuss the theories which can be employed as a framework of analysis.
In her enlightening, cross-disciplinary exploration of the contemporary biometric state, Governing through Biometrics,[12] Btihaj Ajana reminds the reader that biometric measurement and recording is far from a new technology. Finger printing, for example, has been common place in criminal investigation throughout the 20th Century. As discussed above, the widespread application of modern, digitised biometric systems is, in part, facilitated by the technological advances that have enhanced their capacity to automate the process of “linking bodies to identities, and to store and distribute this information readily.”[13]
Advances in technical capabilities, the increased digitisation of society and the ability to readily store and share vast amounts of data across organisations and locations have seemingly made biometrics the technology of choice in an increasingly broad range of applications. The primary focus of this paper is on those applications broadly concerned with border control, security and the ‘war on terror’, however, it is perhaps instructive to refer to Muller who summarises that:
“The possible applications for biometrics, it would seem, are only limited by one’s imagination”[14]
This is certainly the position adopted in a great deal of the biometrics literature, and it is also prominent in the reports of governmental organisations and the rhetoric of policy makers. The European Commission report, Biometrics at the Frontiers, emphasises the immediate application benefits of biometrics for border control, but also notes that:
“The initial […] applications for border control […] will give way in the future to wider use of biometrics for commercial and civil applications”[15]
Similarly, former UK Prime Minister Tony Blair contributed an editorial piece to the Telegraph in 2006, in which he contended that:
“[Biometrics will] go beyond helping us counter problems. Biometric technology will enable us […] to improve access and make secure a whole array of services. By giving certainty in asserting our identity and simplicity in verifying it, biometrics will […] quickly become part of the national infrastructure.”[16]
There is, it seems, a discourse of normalisation relating to the continued integration of biometric technology into daily life, along with an argument that their inclusion is somewhat inevitable. Indeed, both the cited documents are typical of the mainstream discourse, in that they devote little or no space to discussions of whether biometrics should be used – instead they consider the questions to be how much and how soon.[17] It is crucial to note that in employing narratives of inevitability – which are themselves dependent on a highly simplified, instrumental understanding of technology – these accounts do not consider either the reasons for employing biometrics or the consequences of their use.
This largely uncritical embrace of biometric technologies by western governments is exemplified by Canadian Minister for Citizenship and Immigration Denis Coderre who, at a 2003 Citizenship and Immigration Canada Forum, stated that “the biometrics train has left the station.”[18] The assumption communicated here, and reiterated countless times in the statements of other policy leaders and security actors, is that the moment for political, sociological or, indeed, ethical debate has passed. The task now at hand, it is argued, is to discover novel applications for these technologies whilst analysing and improving upon their efficacy.[19]
Alongside the apparent inevitability of biometrics, is a strong belief in the infallibility of these technologies. The reports of security contractors and the comments of military professionals show even greater faith in the utility and advance of biometric technologies. The importance given to the collection and analysis of data, and the emphasis on maximising information will be discussed in more detail in the following chapter; however, the following statements are illustrative. From active US Army serviceman, Sgt. Maj. Robert Haemmerle:
“You can present a fake identification card. You can shave your beard off. But you can’t change your biometrics.” [20]
And from the Biometrics Task Force:
“Biometric technology implementation has increased in recent years and is helping protect the nation by keeping it more secure. New, lightweight, multi-modal devices make distinguishing between an insurgent and a civilian in a war environment easier”[21]
And, finally from Gen. David H. Petraeus
“This data is virtually irrefutable” [22]
Again, accounts of infallibility understand biometrics simply on an instrumental level – as the most appropriate tool for a specific task. In doing so they do not adequately capture the myriad complexities of either their use or their consequences. Whereas a critical approach may attempt to frame biometrics as a substantive technology – one that both arises from, and is mutually constitutive of, a particular kind of security and a particular mode of governance – the conventional strategic position is that governments must maximise the security and convenience benefits of this infallible technology.
In appraising such analyses, Muller contends that “arguments insensitive to [these] phenomena […] misleadingly focus on the policy of biometrics rather than the politics of biometrics.”[23]
Biometrics are often described de facto as a response to modernity. Dialogues that emphasise the significance of modernity in biometrics refer to the specific challenges (and benefits) posed by globalisation, to the fast pace of a digitised global economy and to the need to maintain parity of technology and efficiency.
Perhaps the most obvious articulation of this sentiment comes again from former UK Prime Minister, Tony Blair:
“The case for ID cards is a case not about liberty but about the modern world.” [24]
And, in a separate address:
“The real issue here is not privacy or cost, it is modernity. We face new problems. Biometric technology offers new solutions”
Finally, and perhaps most crucially, biometrics are constructed as a technology which will facilitate the dual goal of allowing the efficient mobility of citizens, whilst preventing the movement of dangerous or undesirable elements:
“[…] the two objectives of security and prosperity in a global hub are not necessarily in conflict. There is significant potential for general wins through improved targeting (through better use of better information), which can lead to minimising contact and burdens on the legitimate traveller or trader while focusing impact on the illegitimate.”[25]
This must be seen as a key component example of the dominant security discourse which emerged as part of the ‘war on terror.’ It can be seen as a continuation of George W. Bush’s statement made directly in the wake of the 9/11 attacks:
“We are a welcoming country, we will always value freedom – yet we will not allow those who plot against our county to abuse our freedoms and our protection.”[26]
This approach openly endorses dichotomous relationship between liberty and security. At its core is the idea that if we are to be safe from the unknown, we must sacrifice some of our liberty or privacy in order to become known ourselves. This oppositional understanding of liberty and security is further reflected in the evolution of multi-lane borders and checkpoints, at which certain (known or otherwise trusted) individuals may enjoy the convenience of express entry/exit, whereas others experience stringent checking and verification. Most crucially, this zero-sum reasoning also reflects an oppositional approach to being secure – that is, that for ‘us’ to be secure, there is necessarily a ‘them’ that is dangerous.
It is also significant that this narrative simultaneously invokes the need for securitisation and for an exceptional response in the curtailment of the liberty of some, whilst also normalising the technology as one which will facilitate convenience and protect the freedom of others.
The perceived need to identify (living) bodies and to determine where they are going is doubtlessly a preoccupation of contemporary government– this can be seen as a consequence of shifts in both geopolitics and governmental imperatives. Indeed, in order to move beyond the superficial articulations of technological utility, and prior to undertaking further discussion of biometrics in the ‘war on terror’ it is necessary to engage with the underlying political contexts and rationales that govern their use.
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[1] Woodward, J. (2005). Using Biometrics to Achieve Identity Dominance in the Global War on Terrorism. Military Review, [online] 85(5), p.30. Available at: https://www.questia.com/library/journal/1P3-942160821/using-biometrics-to-achieve-identity-dominance-in [Accessed 4 Sep. 2015]. 30
[2] http://gsnmagazine.com/article/20668/biometrics_essential_winning_war_terror
[3] Amoore, L. (2006). Biometric borders: Governing mobilities in the war on terror. Political Geography, 25(3), pp.336-351.
[4] US House of Representatives Final Report, cited in: Amoore, L. (2006). Biometric borders: Governing mobilities in the war on terror. Political Geography, 25(3), pp.336-351.
[5] Accentrue, Kestelyn, 2002, 8** Accenture Press Release, (2015). [online] Available at: http://www.carers3.accenture.com/ careers/global.aboutaccenture/careersnews/cn-usvisit [Accessed 3 Sep. 2015].
[6] DHS Budget in Brief. (2015). [online] Available at: http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/FY_2016_DHS_Budget_in_Brief.pdf [Accessed 3 Sep. 2015].
[7] Mansfield-Devine, S. (2012). Biometrics at war: the US military’s need for identification and authentication. Biometric Technology Today, 2012(5), pp.5-8., 5
[8] http://www.telegraph.co.uk/comment/personal-view/3633979/We-need-ID-cards-to-secure-our-borders-and-ease-modern-life.html
[9] http://findbiometrics.com/tony-blair-biometric-technology-integral-to-securing-our-borders/
[10] Peoples, C. (2010). Justifying ballistic missile defence. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
[11] Ibid
[12] Ajana, B. (2013). Governing through biometrics. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan
[13] Ibid
[14] Müller, B. (2010). Security, risk and the biometric state. London: Routledge, 108
[15] Ipts.jrc.ec.europa.eu, (2015). The Institute for Prospective Technological Studies. [online] Available at: http://ipts.jrc.ec.europa.eu/publications/pub.cfm?id=1235 [Accessed 3 Sep. 2015].
[16] http://www.telegraph.co.uk/comment/personal-view/3633979/We-need-ID-cards-to-secure-our-borders-and-ease-modern-life.html
[18] Müller, B. (2010). Security, risk and the biometric state. London: Routledge., 118
[20] http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/14/world/asia/14identity.html?_r=0
[21] http://www.army.mil/article/21940/biometrics-on-the-ground-and-in-the-dod/
[22] http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/14/world/asia/14identity.html?_r=0
[23] Müller, B. (2010). Security, risk and the biometric state. London: Routledge., 23
[24] http://www.telegraph.co.uk/comment/personal-view/3633979/We-need-ID-cards-to-secure-our-borders-and-ease-modern-life.html
[25] Home Office, 2008, cited in Ajana, B. (2013). Governing through biometrics. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
[26] George W. Bush 2001, 8 November, accessed at: http://www.johnstonsarchive.net/terrorism/bush911f.html
Tom Hobson 
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